The predictably dismal performance of the healthcare.gov rollout
reminded me today of some other computing revolutions that I was once a
part of. Way back in 1984, my first ship was the Middle East Force
flagship, USS LASALLE. When I reported aboard in March it had a total of
one computer. (We don't know what was in SSES, do we? No. No we don't.) It left the ship and Bahrain on the C5 I
arrived on after a little mishap with some coke and an Operations
Specialist in the Combat Information Center. Six months later it was
returned and locked up. It was pre-JOTS-In-A-Box but I have no idea what
it was used for because it was secret. Right about then, the Chief
Engineer returned from leave with a brand new Commodore 64 computer. The
only real computer on the ship. It didn't contribute much to the war
effort.
There were other significant computing milestones in my navy. Remind me to tell you about them sometime. My next major entanglement with navy computing happened a year after I reported aboard Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command when the Navy and EDS rolled out the Navy Marine Corps Internet. It was an unqualified disaster that took YEARS to resolve. From:
DTIC.
Abstract : In October of 2000, the Navy's leadership entered a
multi-billion dollar IT service contract with a private company to build
and maintain the Navy-Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI). The hope was to
have the new intranet fully operational in just two years, but the
program encountered so many difficulties that, almost six years later,
the initial implementation process is still underway. Aside from the
unexpectedly high number of applications that needed to be migrated to
the new network and the repeated attacks by members of Congress and
other government agencies, by far the largest obstacle to NMCI s success
has been the end users resistance to change. The Navy s leaders
underestimated the significant cultural change brought on by the
implementation of NMCI, and as a result, they were not adequately
prepared to deal with the negative user response. After providing a
historical account on how NMCI was conceived, planned and delivered,
this thesis goes deeper into NMCI s implementation process by recounting
the experiences of those who used NMCI at the site level. Once the
history and site case study are presented, this thesis ties in the theme
of change to show how proper communication can facilitate the success
of future transformation initiatives.
The gory bits are in the thesis which is
here.
What happened is spelled out very well in Mr. Taylor's Thesis. A "good idea" was had at the very top by profoundly important people who directed their minions to find a loophole in the Acquisition Rules that would allow the Navy to do an end-run around ALL of Congress and implement the little SIX BILLION dollar contract without troubling the Congress. That was profoundly stupid.
Then they grossly underestimated just how much the navy relied on computers and applications unheard of within the Beltway.
Then they really screwed up and chose what they called a "disadvantaged" navy facility and the very heartbeat of the Navy's Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) as the first two sites to implement the initial roll out of NMCI. Guess how the people that work at the core of C4ISR felt at being totally excluded and left out of the loop on designing, building and installing the biggest thing in navy computers since POLARIS? And the profoundly important people thought that using them as fodder and unheralded minor guinea pigs in the network catastrophe was a "good idea."
The NMCI took up to an hour to log onto and up to an hour to log off. A lot of the time it didn't log me off and I just turned off the machine. We all did. We started to complain and found ourselves promptly labeled as resistant to change and unwilling to change our ways. It was no use pointing out that our work required access to working computers and the network and if change was necessary couldn't we wait until after EMP took the whole thing down worldwide before we re-adapted to working in the 19th century?
The profoundly important people decided that the time and dollars spent qualifying and approving all the myriad applications that people used to do the work was too burdensome and so they just took an axe to whole swathes of programs. They axed a lot of purely Navy programs. Obviously, they quickly paid through the nose to buy newer better and NMCI compliant software from contractors who got serious friction burns on their palms from rubbing their hands together in glee.
The process was so fiendishly complex (and made even more so in every way by the gracious researchers, scientists, technicians and programmers) at Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center San Diego, that the profoundly important ones decided, after a year or two of open warfare, to permit the SSC people to have an exemption from NMCI and retain their own networks, computers, servers, etc.
When I look back and compare the implementation of NMCI with the
implementation of Obamacare I am surprised by how they both managed every
pie.
"And then Epaminondas was careful how he stepped on those pies!
He stepped - right - in - the - middle - of - every - one."