That term used to be an obsolete security term. In my time it joined NOFORN as a complete waste of ink. I remember one comment by a general officer that "this should be formerly restricted data" because the author just described exactly how to make a nuclear bomb; something he was familiar with since he used to make them. I didn't see any answer by anybody above in the chain of command but when you know a guy who truly does know how build atomic and hydrogen bombs, you don't get lost on the significance of the evidence.
The only thing keeping them rare is the absence of access to fissionable material. Based on evidence from the Air Force about mishandling fusion bombs I really am kind of surprised DC, Detroit and NYC have not blown up yet.
In time perhaps. I wouldn't want to live there. It's just a matter of time.
2 comments:
I have read various reports about the theft of medical-grade materials, some purpose-driven thefts, others they think the thieves just stole cases/boxes and then found that the cases were "worthless". I don't remember where exactly but somewhere in the deep southwest of the U.S., authorities recovered a transport case that had been opened and then discarded in a ditch when the thief found a rice-sized pellet that was meant for machinery to treat cancer with radiation. It may not be long before someone bright enough (or dumb) starts making dirty bombs. Like you wrote, Chicago, Detroit, etc.
As an aside, I am flabbergasted that Omarosa (sp?) was able to record her firing in a SCIF. We, Naval Security Group Activity (NSGA) people were threatened with being buried under the prison if we even DARED to think of breaking the rules/laws of the SCIF. And SECSTATE Clinton (from what I read) left her home SCIF door ajar because she didn't like having to remember a code or combination, AND allowed her maid access!?!
On the carrier we had the hidden keypad box with the rocker switches to unlock the door in the passageway. The rule was: if there is anyone in the passageway, you don't enter the code. Wait. And remember, our SCIF was in "officers' territory" (Blue Tile Spook? Anyone?) near the Captain's in-port cabin so there wasn't much traffic. We didn't often have to wait.
The funniest/saddest thing I remember from my days was an on-board officer scheduling dinner and drinks with an ashore officer in San Diego. Because of restricted ship's movement info, at least in the 1990's, was 3 days ahead, the officer marked the message SECRET and sent it via our TACINTEL network.
You mentioned "formerly restricted data". That wasn't around in my time (1989-1994) but neither was UNCLASSIFIED BUT RESTRICTED. When I read the term UBR a few years ago I just had to shake my head. It referred to a newspaper article that was being passed around the community.
Best,
Blue Tile Spook
On LaSalle we had blue tile spooks in the SSES while it was MIDEASTFOR flagship. God only knows what they did to it SCIF wise when it went off to be 6th Fleet flagship. I'm sure the well deck was probably given over to 40,000 square feet of SCIF.
Formerly restricted data had to do with science and math and it lost whatever mystique it had as people gradually became aware of the fact that other people could do science and get the same answers.
My favorite was inspectors telling me that all of my engineering logs, all of them, had to be marked "UNCLASSIFIED". I pointed out that in the absence of any security marking the classification level is UNCLASSIFIED. They weren't buying it. They left the ship and I ignored them.
LEO sensitive and UNCLAS but restricted were two of the stupidest things I saw. As a security manager COMSEC guy CMS4K, CMS4L kind of guy there are only three levels of classification and that's it. NOFORN, WNINTEL, SCI, SAP and all the rest were all just garnishes on the basic 3 levels.
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