Friday, April 10, 2020


We will no doubt be bombarded by differing opinions about the incident on the USS Theodore Roosevelt and the relief of the ship's commanding officer by the acting Secretary of the Navy. That's one of the things we get with the internet. Used to be usenet was full of old curmudgeons arguing about which submarine single handedly won World War II and who was the best admiral of them all and the threads would run to the hundreds as people wrangled about it good-naturedly. With what happened in Guam there is less attention paid to good nature. On the face of it, it was ugly.

There is a fascinating article at Real Clear Defense which brings to light a number of hitherto unknown facts about what led up to Captain Crozier getting shoved overboard. As I read it, I tend to think Crozier was one of those truly shitty subordinates you sometimes find yourself burdened with and from which there is no respite until one of you is gone.
A review of the facts here offers some valuable lessons about leadership – or its lack thereof – via an affair that, sadly, is all too typical in modern Washington. (Full disclosure: I have known Mr. Modly for more than 25 years, and as a former work colleague with deep knowledge of his personal integrity, professional competence, and most importantly, reverential love for the United States Navy and its extended family, I am a strong defender of his decision to relieve the commander of the Roosevelt; I say this having considered detailed facts of the case that most critics have blatantly ignored. I also am very hopeful Captain Crozier sees a repassage to his career in the Navy, something former Acting SECNAV Modly very much wanted as well.). Here are the relevant facts of the case, including details the screaming Beltway critics ignored in their rush to judgment:
The Roosevelt docked at Da Nang, Vietnam, in a historic show-the-flag visit from March 4th-9th, just the second carrier to visit Vietnam since relations were restored in 1995. While Navy operations planners are scanning the world in following the coronavirus outbreak and proceeding with caution, Vietnam had only around 20 reported cases then. The visit proceeded, as it was considered important as a signal to China, North Korea, and Russia of growing American-Vietnamese rapprochement and friendship.
Several of the Roosevelt’s crew stayed on shore in various Da Nang hotels, including one where two British tourists were found to have become infected with the virus; there were also visits to the Roosevelt from other nations’ naval air crews in early March. In any case, regardless of contact point, by mid-March, while cruising in the Philippine Sea, Roosevelt crew members began to test positive for COVID-19; a decision was made to put into Guam a week early, with the ship arriving there on Friday, March 27th, with 30 coronavirus infectees already identified.
Secretary Modly briefed the media that morning and announced there were 800 testing kits aboard the carrier, and more were being flown to Guam that day. By then, two sailors aboard the U.S.S. Ronald Reagan, docked at Yokosuka, Japan, had also tested positive, leading to a lockdown of the entire base there, and the Navy’s concern about the combat readiness of naval airpower in the western Pacific had become heightened – especially with North Korea again test-firing missiles, and China trading insults with the United States over the virus and trade disputes, while menacing Taiwan as well.
By Sunday, March 29th, Roosevelt CO Brett Crozier had become increasingly alarmed about the threat of a rampant outbreak aboard the ship, with the entirety of the crew all on board in close quarters while docked at the Apra Harbor naval base. In an email interchange with Secretary Modly’s chief of staff Bob Love that day, though, Mr. Love asked Crozier what he needed: Love detected “no alarm bells, no hair on fire,” Secretary Modly relayed to David Ignatius of the Washington Post. Captain Crozier merely answered “just speed,” when pressed for specific critical needs, and to “get people off the ship as fast as we could.” Following orders from Mr. Modly, Love gave Crozier the acting secretary’s personal cellphone number and told him to call 24/7 if he needed anything more. 
Yet the next day, Monday, March 30, an exasperated and deeply-worried Crozier sent his 4-page letter to approximately 20 recipients via unsecured email, bypassing the carrier strike group commander, Rear Admiral Stuart Baker, berthed just 15 feet down his passageway on the Roosevelt. Additionally, the Roosevelt CO chose to ignore the carrier's hyper-secure communications facilities with instantaneous access to Pearl Harbor, San Diego, and Washington, and also disregarded the personal cellphone number of Acting SECNAV Modly, given him the day before, for immediate direct access to the top of his chain of command. That same day, Modly’s chief of staff, Mr. Love, called Captain Crozier a second time, as follow-up, but heard no new requests or concerns, nor any notice of the frantic letter which appeared the next day, Tuesday, March 31, in the San Francisco Chronicle (which happens to be Crozier’s hometown newspaper).
The publication of Crozier’s plea for help was, as Secretary Modly pointed out, predictable in this digital communications age, but it caught the Navy brass by surprise, both in form and substance (e.g., the letter was not addressed to anyone, and contained no detailed specific action plan or insights into what about the Navy's surge of resources wasn't going well). Most pointedly, Crozier's missive did not at all "square" with the CO not talking to Admiral Baker, berthed within feet of him on the Roosevelt, at all about this, nor with the previous days' communications with Secretary Modly's staff that included availability of a direct line to Modly. Predictably though, the story made national news immediately, and among other things caused concern and consternation for the families of the Roosevelt’s crew, as well as deflating morale among the crew themselves. Infections by then had hit around 100 and were sure to grow (there are now 230 infected including Captain Crozier himself, though none hospitalized, and more than 2000 Roosevelt sailors are isolated in hotels on Guam).
Modly talked to Captain Crozier directly on Wednesday, April 1, and Crozier admitted he had avoided Admiral Baker or his other communication options [again, including the highly unusual opportunity to call Secretary Modly directly, 24/7, for anything needed, and again, having shown no outsized concern to Mr. Love on the phone within hours of emailing out his letter to a broad audience in an unsecured manner]. Crozier reiterated to Modly only that he felt the situation was urgent and did not want to be told to not send out his “distress flare.”
Here's the moment when leaders must make tough decisions: Modly, considering [a] the sequence of events and the distress caused, [b] the lack of forthrightness from Crozier, either with Admiral Baker, or Messrs. Love or Modly themselves and [c] the consequences of Crozier's strange choice for his communication of a warning, given other considerable options, relieved Crozier of command the next day, on Thursday, April 2nd.  That afternoon Modly gave a detailed press conference explaining his actions, showing unusual candor but also praising the stellar career of Captain Crozier, a decorated naval aviator and combat veteran. The Acting SECNAV also emphasized that in no way was Captain Crozier's career over and that he believed in redemption; he just felt that in this extreme situation of COVID-19, a steadier hand was needed aboard the Roosevelt. 
I don't agree with Modly. I find Crozier's actions despicable. He had direct communication with the Secretary of the Navy and went out of his way to stab him in the back. He did the same thing to Admiral Baker, his Immediate Superior in Command and so also to Commander 7th Fleet, CINCPACFLT and the CNO. If there was ever a commanding officer who deserved to be sacked it is Crozier.

Read the whole article at the link. It's definitive and shares the facts the media decided against placing into evidence for your consideration.

We'll touch on backstabbers in the leadership page a little later.


Bobo the Hobo said...

For some reason Beau Bergdhal came to mind, not that Captain Crozier deserted his post, but his actions were a linchpin resulting in the resignation of a good man.

And the Left inflicts yet another paper cut against our nation.

Captain Steve said...

Quite agree.Not sure why the ISIC didn't do the firing though. SECNAV involvement just poured gasoline on the fire, particularly his(?) decision to visit the ship and address her crew.

capt fast said...

truly appreciate your take on the affair and your backstory on the activities not mentioned in lamestream media. thank you.

Borepatch said...

Modly would have a lot more credibility if he hadn't flown from Washington DC to Guam to spike the football on the TR.

HMS Defiant said...

Oh yes,
Crozier must have known at the time that sending that email was a really stupid thing to do and Modly must have known that flying himself to Guam to 'explain' to Crozier's crew how stupidly Crozier behaved was a really really stupid thing to do. Both actions showed bad judgement. That's the sort of thing you can get away with in any inconsequential job but not as CO of a ship and not as SECNAV. As we see, both were relieved for cause.