I was reading the latest from Simplicius this evening and it struck me as I was reading about the latest collapse of the battle front in Ukraine that what we are seeing played out there is a lot like what Sir Julian Corbett wrote about in his book, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy. In a twist unique to this blog we're going to stand the normal order of things military on its head and see what applying maritime strategy looks like when its overlaid on military strategy. The second link above will let you download the book at Project Gutenberg to read for yourself if you're interested.
Corbett was one of the three naval strategists we studied back when we were young. He, Alfred Thayer Mahan and Jomini were the big 3 in addressing characteristics of naval strategy and applying them to history. One might say that a study of history was a necessary foundation for strategy but it sure doesn't look like it is anymore.
Corbett was the one that wrote about the simple fact that appears to escape every stupid naval strategist today and most of the lamer ones of the last 100 years.
“The object of naval warfare must always be directly or
indirectly either to secure the command of the sea or to
prevent the enemy from securing it.
The second part of the proposition should be noted with
special care in order to exclude a habit of thought, which is
one of the commonest sources of error in naval speculation.
That error is the very general assumption that if one
belligerent loses the command of the sea it passes at once to
the other belligerent. The most cursory study of naval history
is enough to reveal the falseness of such an assumption. It
tells us that the most common situation in naval war is that
neither side has the command; that the normal position is not a
commanded sea, but an uncommanded sea. The mere assertion,
which no one denies, that the object of naval warfare is to get
command of the sea actually connotes the proposition that the
command is normally in dispute.”
He continues a few paragraphs later,
“In the first place, "Command of the Sea" is not identical in
its strategical conditions with the conquest of territory. You
cannot argue from the one to the other, as has been too
commonly done. Such phrases as the "Conquest of water
territory" and "Making the enemy's coast our frontier" had
their use and meaning in the mouths of those who framed them,
but they are really little but rhetorical expressions founded
on false analogy, and false analogy is not a secure basis for a
theory of war.”
When the command of the seas wavered it wavered pretty hard.
During the Okinawa campaign, the Japanese kamikaze attacks resulted in the sinking of 36 Allied ships and the damaging of 368 others, with an estimated 4,907 Allied sailors killed and 4,824 wounded. These figures were largely the result of widespread and persistent suicide attacks that occurred between March and June 1945, impacting numerous naval vessels supporting the invasion. Author's note: this is my first AI quote. Yay AI!
We are going to see that the common precept now for all warfare must be one of a total lack of command of the sky, command of the sea or pushing the front forward to destroy and envelop the enemy which yields total command of the land behind the front to the one occupying the territory. It simply isn't going to work like that anymore.
I also saw a news headline that said that the US Army was buying a million drones. I do hope not. There is nothing worse than ossified doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures based on buying the wrong hardware and then gearing all of that around the purchased obsolete crap the bean counters bought. Of course this raises two fundamental problems with breakthrough tech in modern times.
1. The whole concept of exploiting breakthrough tech is instantly poisoned by putting it in the hands of the Civil Service and one of the military's formally established labs. I might offer it to MCTSSA but even there it is doomed to eventual corruption by bureaucrat.
2. Put the whole idea into a series of non-stop RFPs for really cool, cheap, deadly long range / short range, tactical, surveillance, bomb delivery or other drones and have industry just flood the Pentagon and services with some really cool, cheap deadly designs. The obvious problem here is that the Pentagon can't and won't buy them all so they'll end up on the world market and find their way into the hands of our enemies or even worse, democrats and liberal progressives.
As you read up on the battles and cauldrons consuming men for nothing in Ukraine it is hard to believe that military strategists and generals are right now keen to put this all behind us because they know that this is not how they plan to wage war. In their minds nothing has changed since Desert Storm and they mean to keep right on exploiting those features of the military industrial complex and expanding on Counter Insurgency Operations.
All through the Cold War the premier threat we all accepted was a sudden and devastating attack on the nation's capital and the death or destruction of the national command authority and we knew our potential enemies had the means to get a sea launched ballistic missile over the capital in as little as 12 minutes. We developed something like the Launch on Warning of television and movie fame. We had no choice.
The interesting thing though is that back then we knew of one other country on the planet that had that capability. Now? Well now we have anybody with a few bucks and some tech savvy who can pretty much flood the National Capital Region with dozens of drones practically at will.
Something else we used to read about back in that old war was the Look Down Shoot Down capabilities we'd need to deal with some threats. How much thought do you suppose the Air Defense mavens at the NCR have given to collateral damage from shooting down drones with high explosives over Bethesda, Arlington, Alexandria, etc? That's just on the strategic level. How are the C4I nodes of the various generals going to survive in the same but worse threat environment of today?
I know the Russian General Staff has been working on these matters for a couple of years now. I suspect our versions of the General Staff (we don't have one) haven't even looked at what it means, what it will take to stop it and how they will command the resources to eliminate the threat as needed over those areas where command of the skies or command of the seas is essential and must be unequivocal. Hell, they're all in unpaid status and may be out fishing for all I know.
The United States since its founding has been immune to deep strike. We don't even think about it because nobody can attack us from thousands of miles away short of using ballistic missiles....except we flooded our country with enemy civilians and they can and are exploiting every loophole (loopholes the size of the Grand Canyon) to be able to instantly implement death and destruction if we go to war with their principal country. You see them smuggling in biological materials that will destroy our crops and poison the land. They bought up land around our strategic air bases. They are ready now to wage this kind of warfare.
We read about the Russian's shadow fleet of tankers but I wonder that we don't hear about their shadow industries that have set up scores of fronts inside the USA to carry out deep strikes as needed in the future. They're out there. They always will be, now.